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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEE BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs

Case No. 14468

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
MORGAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of
the Court in favor of the Defendant.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was tried to a jury on October 23 and 24,
1975.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court instructed the

jury and submitted the case to them on Special Interrogatories.

1
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4
In answer to the first Interrogatory, the jury found that Appellant's
contract of employment with Respondent to be not divisible.

In
i

answer to the second, third and fourth Interrogatories, the jury
found that Plaintiff had resigned his position as a coach, but not
his position as a teacher.

In answer to the fifth Interrogatory

the jury found Plaintiff's damage to be $10,371.39. Thereafter,
Plaintiff moved the Court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on the grounds that the issue of the divisibility of Plaintiff's
contract of employment with Respondent was not divisible as a
matter of law.

The Court entered judgment in favor of Respondent
*

and against Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks to have the Court reverse the
judgment and order of the lower Court finding that Appellant's
contract of employment with Respondent was divisible as a matter
of law, that Respondent breached its contract of employment with
Appellant, that it did not comply with the requirements of the
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, Utah Code
Annotated, Sections 53-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975), and that
therefore, Appellant is entitled to reinstatement as a school
teacher and damages in the sum of $.10,371.39.

2
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i

FACTS
Appellant was employed by Respondent as a school teacher
for the school years 1972-73 and 1973-74 pursuant to written contracts.
Additionally, Appellant was assigned to coach football and wrestling
for which he received additional compensation.

Appellant's Exhibit

1 was executed June 18, 1973 for the school year 1973-74 and is
his most recent contract of employment with Respondent.
Appellant considers two sentences of the contract relevant
to this case.

One sentence provides:

basic schedule will be $7,814."

fl

Your salary according to the

The other sentence provides:

"Amounts for extra services will be added when definite assignments
have been made."

It is Appellant's contention, as will be more

fully developed below, that Appellant's contract of employment
was severable.
The Respondent is a duly organized and existing School
District and political subdivision of the State of Utah.
On January 8, 1974, while still employed by Respondent,
Appellant addressed a letter to Mr. Jerry Peterson, the Principal
at Morgan High School where Appellant taught and to Mr. Raymond P.
Larson, Superintendent of the Respondent School District, in which

3
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he stated he was resigning from the "coaching staff at Morgan High
School" and further stated that "I am not resigning as a teacher."
The full text of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
i On or about January 17, 1974, Superintendent Larson
wrote to Appellant stating he had presented Appellant's letter to
the Board of Education of the Morgan County School District at a
meeting held January 14, 1974, and that the Board had decided to
accept his resignation as a coach.

The letter then stated:

"The

i

Board wishes me to instruct you that your services as a teacher
will also be terminated at the close of the 1973-74 school year."
A copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
On February 1, 1974, a conference was held between
Superintendent Larson, Miss Dorothy Zimmerman and Appellant at
which Appellant stated that he had not resigned his employment
with the Respondent School District but that he had resigned only
his position as a coach.

T. 29.

4
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On March 22, 1974, Superintendent Larson received a
second letter from Mr. A..M. Ferro, Appellantfs attorney, requesting
a termination hearing.

A copy of that letter is attached hereto

as Exhibit 4.
On April 5, 1974, Mr. Felshaw King, counsel for the
Respondent School District, replied to Mr. Ferrofs letter indicating
that the Respondent School District was under the impression that
Appellant had resigned his teaching position and therefore a
hearing would not be in order. A copy of that letter is attached
hereto as Exhibit 5*
Respondent has a Written Agreement, which is by reference
incorporated into every teacher's contract of employment and was
so incorporated into Appellant's contract of employment.
The Written Agreement was admitted in evidence as
Appellant's Exhibit 5.

Sections 14-1-1 and 14-1-2 of the Written

Agreement are material to this case for the reason that Respondent
did not comply with those provisions. T. 148

5
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«

Section 14-1-1 provides:
Before any teacher may be dismissed for any cause,
he shall be given a written notice 15 days prior
to the effective date of dismissal signed by the
Superintendent or his representative, stating the
causes for dismissal. Such written notice may be
delivered in person or sent by registered mail
addressed to the teacher at his last known post
office address* A copy of the ''Personnel Procedures
for Certificated Employees11 shall be included with
the notice.

m

Section 14-1-2 provides:
I
^ After receipt of such notice the teacher shall at
his option be entitled to hearings before (1) the
Superintendent of Schools, (2) the appropriate
committee of the Board of Education, and (3) the
Board of Education. The teacher may call the
Association, school staff, and such other witnesses
as he may deem necessary. Said hearing shall
commence within 30 days after receipt of such
notice.

i

<

It is agreed by the parties that Respondent did not
follow the requirements of its own Written Agreement.

Appellant

contends that Respondent's failure to follow the Written Agreement
is a breach of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act,
Utah Code Annotated, Section 53-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).

6
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On October 22 and 23, 1974, the facts surrounding
Appellant's employment with Respondent were heard by a jury.
Pursuant to Special Interrogatories submitted to them, the jury
responded to Interrogatory number one finding that Appellant's
contract of employment with Respondent was not divisible.

In

response to Special Interrogatories numbers two, three and four,
the jury found that Appellant's letter dated January 8, 1974,
constituted a resignation only of his duties as a coach, and not
as a teacher.

In response to Special Interrogatory number five,

the jury found that the Appellant had been damaged in the sum of
$10,371.39.

Following the jury verdict, Appellant made a motion

for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict on the grounds that
Plaintiff's contract of employment was divisible as a matter of law.
On January 15, 1975, the Court entered a Judgment in
favor of the Respondent and against the Appellant on the grounds
that the jury had found Plaintiff's contract of employment to be
not divisible and on the further grounds that the contract, as a
matter of law, was not divisible. Accordingly, the Court reasoned
that the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, supra,
did not apply in this case.

7
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"ARGUMENT
1

: •

;

i •

?

• POINT I •'• ,

-

<:, .. .-

-

THE COURT ERRORED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF
THE DIVISIBILITY OF APPELLANT'S CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT TO THE JURY.
a
Appellant submits that the question of whether or not

m

a contract is divisible is a matter of law to be decided by the
Court.

L

j

.,'•••..;?

The question of interpretation of language :>>..
and conduct ~- the question of what is the
meaning that should be given by a court to u
the words of a contract, is a question of
;: fact, not a question of law . . . . There
:
is no "legal11 meaning separate and distinct
„, from some person's meaning of fact. Corbin ; • ,
on Contracts, Section 554 at page 219 (1960).
We must bear in mind, however, that the
question of fact is like any other question
of fact in that it may be a question that
should be answered by the judge rather than
by the jury. Ici. at pages 220-221.

s

In cases in which it is so answered, it is
probable that the interpreting judge may say
that the interpretation of language is a
"question of law for the court.11 Id,, at
t
page 221.

i ^

^

I

4
!?

If the words of an agreement, whether oral or
written, are definite and undisputed, if there
is no doubt as to the relevant surrounding
circumstances, the interpretation of the words
is- ordinarily held to be amatter for the court.
Id. at pages 224-225.

*

<

8
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The Court has held the interpretation of
contract to be primarily a question of law
for the Court to decide. Pacific States
Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Harsh Utah Corporation,
5 Ut.2d 244, 300 P.2d 610 (1956).
The rule expressed by this Court has support from other
jurisdictions.

17A CJS, Contracts, §616, p. 1242.

The rule that the construction or legal affect
of a contract must be determined by the court
as a question of law applies when the contract
is clear, unambiguous and where there is no
dispute as to the terms of the contract. 17A
CJS, Contracts, §616, pp. 1241-1242.
Appellant submits that the language used in his contract
of employment with Respondent was clear, unambiguous and should
have been decided by the court as a matter of law.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT IS DIVISIBLE
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Appellant submits that his contract of employment with
Respondent was divisible as a matter of law for the reason that
one paragraph specifically states that Appellant was hired as a
teacher and that his salary for the 1973-74 school year was
$7,814.

A separate paragraph provides that: "Amounts for extra

services will be added when definite assignments have been made.,f

9
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Unfortunately, no formula has been devised which
furnishes a test for determining in all cases which contracts are
divisible and which are entire.

17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, §325.

Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435 (C.A. Cal.1957); Higgins v. Green
Top Dairy Farms, 273 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1954).
Professor Williston states:
The distinguishing mark of a divisible contract
is that it admits of apportionment of the
consideration on either side so as to correspond
to the unascertained consideration on the other
side. Where such a purpose appears in the
contract or is clearly deducible therefrom, it
is allowed great significance in ascertaining
the intention of the parties . . . . when there
are no opposing signs. Where these latter
are present it becomes a question of preponderance.
5 Williston on Contracts, S860 p.255 (3rd ed. 1963).
In Simmons v. California Institute of Technology,
34 C.2d 263, 209 P.2d 581 (1949), it was suggested that the test
to determine the divisibility of a contract is, if the consideration
is single, the contract is entire, but if the consideration is
expressly or by necessary implication apportioned, the contract is
severable.

Accord 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, |326.

10
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i

f

4

In Pines of Islip v. Island Concrete Corp., 196 NYS2d
252 (1959) at page 255 the court concluded that where performance
of one of the provisions of a contract was optional with the
defendant, the contract was severable.
In Higgins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, supra, the court
found a contract to purchase a dairy farm to be divisible on the
ground that one of the contested provisions of the contract
involved unliquidated claims.
It was not contemplated or provided by the
contract that plaintiffs could arbitrarily
fix an amount claimed to be due for merchandise
and other items, and demand that payment be
made within forty-eight hours. Jcl. at p. 405.
Following Appellant's return to school at the beginning
of the 1973-74 school year, he was assigned to coach wrestling and
football for which he was paid $434.85 and $260.91 respectively.
If the contract is severable where the part
to be performed by one party consists of
several distinct and separate items and the
price to be paid by the other is apportioned
to each item or is left to be implied by the
law, 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, §327..

11
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i
Appellant submits that his contract of employment with
Respondent was severable in that the only written provisions
i
covered his employment as a teacher.

The additional coaching and

football assignments were made separately and were not included
in the written contract.
separate sum.

Each specific assignment was paid a

-

Furthermore, the written provisions of the contract

made clear that Respondent had the sole authority to decide whether
or not Appellant, who had already signed a written contract of

'

employment with it, would be given additional assignments and
additional compensation.

Clearly, Respondent had no obligation to
i

make any additional assignments or pay any additional compensation
to Appellant pursuant to the terms of the contract.
Appellant could not have compelled Respondent to pay

i

him any additional compensation for extra duties, nor could he
have compelled Respondent to assign him coaching duties.
Appellant submits his duties as a coach were severable
from his teaching duties for the reasons:
1.

His salary as a teacher is clearly set out while

his compensation for his coaching duties were not.

i

12
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2.

The compensation paid him for coaching is clearly

identifiable and is separate from his coaching salary.
3.

The written contract admits of apportionment of

the consideration on either side so as to correspond to the
unascertained (at the time of the contract's execution)
consideration on the other.
4.

(Williston).

Whether or not performance of any additional

assignments would be made to Appellant was optional with
Respondent.
5.

The amount to be paid Appellant was, at the time

the contract was executed, discretionary (and possibly
arbitrary) with Respondent.
POINT III
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF DEMANDED
FOR THE REASON THAT RESPONDENT BREACHED ITS
CONTRACT WITH APPELLANT.
As Appellant did not resign his position as a teacher,
but only his extra assignments as football and wrestling coach,
he is entitled to damages for breach of contract in the sum of
$10,371.39 and for an order reinstating him as a teacher.

13
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Respondent's Written Agreement was by reference incorporated into
and made part of Appellant's contract of employment with Respondent.
Sections 14-1-1 and 14-1-2 are fully set forth above.

Those

Sections state the procedures Respondent must follow in order to
terminate a teacher employed by it. Appellant was and is entitled
to have the contractual rights of Sections 14-1-1 and 14-1-2 of
the Written Agreement enforced by this Court. . Respondent concedes
that it did not comply with the requirements of Sections 14-1-1
and 14-1-2 of its Written Agreement.

Respondent's Answers to

Appellant's Interrogatories R. 97, 99, 101 and 103 through 105.
See also Exhibit 5. ,

:

,

POINT IV
THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES
ACT GOVERNS IN THIS CASE.
A.
AS APPELLANT DID NOT RESIGN HIS POSITION AS
A TEACHER, HE IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF
THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES ACT. .
Appellant submits that the argument set forth above
with respect to Respondent's Written Agreement raise issues
relevant to the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act,

14
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Sections-53-51-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975),
hereinafter

f,

Termination Act.n

Specifically, Sections 14-1-1 and

14-1-2 of the Written Agreement which set forth a procedure for
giving notice and authorizing a hearing on the request of the
teacher, bring Appellant within the protection of the Termination
Act. ....
The relevant subsections of Section 53-51-5 of the
Termination Act provide that a school district shall adopt an
orderly dismissal procedure which must provide:
(1) Right to a fair hearing.
(2) If the district intends not to renew (the)
contract of employment of an individual entitled to
employment in succeeding years according to district
personnel program, notice of such intention shall be
given the individual. Said notice shall be issued at
least two months before the end of the contract term
of the individual, e.g., the school year. The notice
in writing shall be served by personal delivery or by
certified mail addressed to the individual's last known
address. The notice shall be dated and contain a clear
and concise statement that the individual's contract
will not be renewed for an ensuing term and the reasons
for the termination.
(3) In the absence of timely notice, a subparagraph
(2) employee is deemed to be re-employed for the succeeding
contract term with a salary based upon the salary schedule
applicable to the class of employee into which the
individual falls. This provision shall not be construed
to preclude the dismissal of an employee during his
contract term for cause.

15
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«

(4) At least one month prior to issuing notice of
intent not to renew the contract of the individual, he
shall be informed of the fact that continued employment
is in question and the reasons therefor and given an
opportunity to correct the defects which precipitated
possible nonrenewal. The individual may be granted
assistance in his efforts to make correction of the
deficiencies which may include informal conferences
and the services of applicable school personnel within
the district.
(5) A written statement of causes (a) pursuant to
which the contract of individuals may not be renewed,
- (b) pursuant to which the contract of each class of
personnel may not be renewed, and (c) pursuant to which
the contract of individuals may be otherwise terminated
during the contract term.

4

4

4

Section 53-51-6 of the Termination Act provides:
11

At all hearings, after due notice and on demand
of the educator, he may be represented by counsel,
-'• produce witnesses, hear the testimony against him
and cross-examine witnesses and examine documentary
evidence. Hearings may be held before the board
or the board may establish a procedure whereby
hearing is before examiners selected pursuant to
section 53-51-7.
1

Respondent concedes that it did not comply with the
requirements of the above cited requirements of the Termination
Act.

Respondent's Answers to Appellant's Interrogatories R.

97, 99, 101 and 103 through 105.

See also Exhibit 5.

16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

Appellant submits that the purpose of the Termination
Act is remedial. As such, it should be liberally construed of
effect the conduct sought to be corrected.

73 Am. Jur.2d, Statutes,

g278.
As Respondent did not comply with the provisions of the
Termination Act, Appellant is entitled to his loss of salary and
to reinstatement by Respondent.
Subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 53-51-5 of
the Termination Act contemplate that teachers whose performance is
unsatisfactory should be given notice of such finding for the purpose
of enabling the teacher to take steps to correct the teacher's
deficiency.
In the present case, the deficiency would be Appellant's
resignation of his duties as a coach.

Pursuant to the Termination

Act, the Respondent, upon receiving Appellant's letter resigning
his position as a coach but not as a teacher, should have complied
with the requirements of the Termination Act including a written
notice advising Appellant that if he persisted in refusing to
render services as a coach, he would also be terminated as a teacher.

17
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By

EVEN IF APPELLANT'S CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
IS NOT DIVISIBLE, HE IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION
UNDER THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION
PROCEDURES ACT.

4

Appellant submits that the Termination Act applies in
this case whether or not his contract of employment is divisible.
The clear intent of Appellant's letter resigning his
duties as a coach but not as a teacher, was to resign only his
coaching duties. The jury so found in its Answers to the Special
Interrogatories submitted to it.
Even if Appellant!s contract is not divisible, it is
clear that his letter of resignation of January 8, 1974 was for
the purpose of resigning only his coaching duties.

The intent of

the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act is to require
school districts to warn teachers that a course of conduct, if not
corrected, will result in their termination.
Subsection 53-51-5(2), set forth ahve, provides that the
district must in writing notify any teacher whose job security
is protected by the Act, of the district's intention not to renew
the contract of employment.

18
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Subsection 53-51-5(4) provides:
At least one month prior to issuing notice of
intent not to renew the contract of the individual
he shall be informed of the fact that continued
employment is in question and the reasons therefore
and given an opportunity to correct the defects
which precipitated possible nonrenewal.
It is conceded by Respondent that it did not comply
with subsection 53-51-5(4).

It did not notify Appellant that

his resignation of his coaching duties placed his continued
employment in question nor did it give Appellant an opportunity
to correct the defect which precipitated the nonrenewal of his
employment.
Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to be awarded damages
for loss of salary in the sum of $10,371.39 and for an order
reinstating him as a teacher.

CONCLUSIONS
1.

The terms and provisions of Appellant's contract of

employment with Respondent are clear and unambiguous.

Accordingly,

the question of divisibility of the contract is for the Court to
decide as a matter of law.

19
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4
2.

As a matter of law, Appellant's contract of employ-

ment with Respondent is divisible for the reason that:

4
a.

His salary as a teacher is clearly set out while

his compensation for his coaching duties were not.
%. ' The compensation paid him for coaching is clearly
1

4

identifiable and is separate from his coaching salary.
c.

The written contract admits of apportionment of

the consideration on either side so as to correspond to the
unascertained (at the time of the contract's execution)
consideration on the other.
i
d.

Whether or not performance of any additional

assignments would be made to Appellant was optional with
i

Respondent,
e.

The amount to be paid Appellant was, at the time

the contract was executed, discretionary (and possibly
arbitrary) with Respondent.
3.

As Appellant did not resign his position as a

teacher, he is entitled to be compensated for his damages arising
from Respondent's breach of its contract with Appellant and for
an order of the Court reinstating Appellant.

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4.

Respondents Written Agreement created in Appellant

certain job security rights which could only be terminated by
Respondent following the requirements of the Utah Orderly School
Termination Procedures Act. As Respondent did not comply with
the requirements of the Act with respect to Appellant's termination
as a school teacher, Appellant is entitled to his lost salary in
the sum of $10,371-39 and to an order reinstating him as a teacher.
5.

Appellant was entitled to notice that his resignation

as a coach but not as a teacher would be grounds for terminating
his services as a coach pursuant to subsection 51-53-5(4).

Having

failed to comply with that requirement of the Act, Appellant is
entitled to damages and reinstatement.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant is entitled to a
judgment against the Respondent in the sum of $10,371.39 and for
an order of the Court reinstating him as a teacher with the
Respondent at a salary together with such benefits as he would have
received had he remained employed with Respondent.
Respectfully submitt(

MpCHAEL f. McCOY
L4 Walker Bank Building
5alt Lake City, i^tah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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APPELLAM'S EXHIBIT 1
Lee R. Brown
Morgan, Utah
Dear Lee:

We are pleaaed that negotiations have been completed by the committee
representing the teachers and the Morgan School Dictrict. These negotiations
were carried on with a good feeling and desire to reach a solution that would
be equitable for everyone. Since they are now completed and since all of the
teachers are included in the master contract, we feel the following information
will be sufficient to complete agreements between each teacher and the school
district.

Contract period will be 185 days.
Your salary according to the basic schedule will be $ 7,814
Amounts for extra services will be added when definite assignments
have been made.
School calendar will be 180 days as shown on enclosure.

We would appreciate it if you would sign one copy and return to the
District Office.
If you have any queotiona please contact us.

D.

.i^W^ii:
i > w 54f (^ L
iiperintendent'e Signature)

(Teacher's Signature)

^

sn

£fr-7s
(Date)

(Date)
/

p

KXHjbrr..,../i ' -.n

ZndDistricKV^ij.-^
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Rercura LINDA VAN TA:;L.U.
January 8, 1974

Mr. Jerry Peterson, Principal
Mr. Raymond Larson, Superintendent
Morgan County School Board of Education
Morgan, Utah 84050
Gentlemen:
This letter is a formal resignation on my part from the coaching staff at
Morgan High School.
I am not resigning as a teacher and I will continue to try and uphold the
high academic standards which you have set.
I no longer feel that my presence in the athletic program would be beneficial to anyone involved in the program. My personal and professional
opinions and priorities are drastically different from the opinions and
priorities which the District's athletic program is now being run on.
There is also the problem of financial security, which is my personal
problem. Coaching in this school district has been a problem of financial
loss instead of gain—especially during this last year.
I cite the following examples:
1. Trips to Ogden to straighten out equipment orders or pick
up la6t minute supplies.
2.

Using my car to take kids home to Croyden, Milton or the
Highlands because the practice ran longer than the one
hour and fifteen minutes we are presently on, or because
it is a Saturday practice or Holiday practice.

3.

I lost an opportunity to pick up Vi hours of college creditf;
worth about $200 because I was coaching. I need 6 credit
hours to get to the B.S. plus 30 lane on the salary schedule
which will raise my salary $300. It will cost me an additional $200 travel to go to the University of Utah to receive
this credit.

These expenses may seem insignificant but when you compare them with my
coaching salary: $175 net for football + $350 net for wrestling - $525
net for coaching.
I feel it cost me $275 out of ray pocket, which only geto $7814 this year
CROSS income from teaching.
I feel that to be a good coach, you have to sacrifice everything of yourflelf and your athletes. However, I no longer feel like I have anything
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Jerry Pctcroon» Principal & Otlncs
Page 2
January 8, 1974

Please consider this resignation effective at the conclusion df the Morgan
High School Wrestling Season.
Sincerely,

Lee R. Drown
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BOARD OF EDUCATION
RAYMOND P. LARSON

MORGAN C O U N T i S C H O O L DISTRICT

PHONE B2i>.34ii

OFFICEOFTHESUPERINTENDENT

2 4 0 EAST YOUNG STREET

• UP-ERiNtrHDrNT

MORGAN, UTAH
84050

January 17, 1974

Lee Brown
RFI)
Morgan, Utah 84050
Dear Lee:
I presented your letter concerning your position as a coach and
teacher in the Morgan School District to the Board of Education at
their regular meeting, held January 14, 1974.
They would like me to express their appreciation to you for the
services you have rendered during the years you have been employed
in the Morgan District. They regret the differences you have expressed,
as to your feelings and the District program as it is being operated.
They hereby accept your resignation as a member of the coaching staff
of Morgan High School for the reasons which you have stated.
However, since you were hired as a coach and teacher, and since
it will be necessary to employ someone to replace you as a coach, it
will also necessitate this person being employed to replace you as a
teacher; therefore, the Board wishes me to instruct you that your
services as a teacher would also be terminated at the close of the
1973-74 school year.
This action and understanding will permit the administration to
begin interviewing someone to replace you both as coach and teacher.
Sincerely,

{' yO

U (c

A -J,"
'' ,

cyt*'W'W'y&*'JSz

Raymond P. Larson,
Superintendent
}

RPL:pp
cc:

Jerry Peterson
Board Members

_

p

EXHIBIT
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p/^r^'ittit^ <?
2nd District Court, Utah

March 22, 1974

Qkmi^2\mu.4^JJ '?*'

.Board of Education
Morgan County School District
240 East Young Street
Morgan, Utah 84050
ATTN;

MR. RAYMOND P. LARSON, SUPERINTENDENT

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR HEARING - LEE BROWN - NONRENEWAL
OF CONTRACT

Gentlemen:

•'i

rs

le

Morgan County School District
March 22, 1974
Page 2

This letter is written to you by me as attorney for Lee Brown.
In his behalf, I hereby make request for a hearing upon the
matter of the intention of the Board not to renew the contract
of employment of Lee Brown.
It is hereby requested that the hearing be conducted before one
or more examiners as contemplated by Sections 53-51-6 and 53-51-7
of the Code.
It is further requested that the Board provide Mr. Lee Brown with:
a.

A statement of the causes pursuant to which it is
intended not to renew his contract of employment, and

b.

Notification as to the time and place at which the
hearing will be held.
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A. M. Ferro, Esquire
Attorney at Law
Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

84111

Our Client: Morgan County School District
Your Client: Lee Brown

Dear Mr. Ferro:
We are replying to your letter of March 22, 1974,
addressed to the attention of Mr. Raymond P. Larson,
Superintendent of Schools of Morgan County School
District, as follows:
It is the position of the Morgan County School
District that Mr. Brown resigned his position as a
teacher by letter of January 8, 1974, a copy of which
we presume you have in your possession. Accordingly,
the provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act are not pertinent and there is no
necessity for a hearing in connection with this matter,
If you have any questions concerning this matter,
please contact us at your convenience.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
KING & KING

F e l s h a w King
FK:smg

j>

jEi^lX
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